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KVΛZAR

// Web3 security · Audits · Research · AI audit agent

Illuminating vulnerabilities before they're exploited.

Kvazar pairs expert manual audits with its own AI audit agent. Every contract gets a machine's patience and a researcher's judgement, and every finding ships with proof.

Read our research

// 01 — What we do

Security work that produces evidence, not opinions.

Four ways we work with protocol teams, all of them ending in findings you can reproduce.

Smart-contract audits

Manual, line-by-line review by researchers who have shipped and broken production protocols. Solidity, Rust, Move.

AI audit agent

Our own agent reads the whole codebase, builds a threat model and triages candidates by severity. Humans verify every report.

Security research

Original findings across DeFi, bridges and infrastructure, published with reproductions and disclosure timelines.

Bug bounty & disclosures

Responsible disclosure to protocols and bounty programs, with fixes contributed upstream where we can.

// 02 — The Kvazar agent & panel

Watch an audit happen.

The agent reads code the way a researcher does: it maps trust boundaries, follows value, and flags where the two disagree. Below is a scan of a deliberately broken sample vault.

  • Automated scanning of every contract, every commit
  • Severity triage with reproduction steps, not just pattern matches
  • Human-verified reports — a researcher signs off on every finding
  • Re-scan on pull request, so fixes don't introduce regressions
contracts/Vault.solkvazar agent · scanning
1contract Vault {
2 mapping(address => uint256) public balances;
3 address public owner;
4
5 function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
6 require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
7 (bool ok, ) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}("");critical
8 // return value of call is never checkedmedium
9 balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
10 }
11
12 function setOwner(address n) external {
13 require(tx.origin == owner);high
14 owner = n;
15 }
16}
// Findings0 / 3
  1. F-01criticalL7

    Reentrancy: external call before state update

    balances is decremented after the call; a malicious receiver can re-enter withdraw().

  2. F-02mediumL8

    Unchecked low-level call result

    `ok` is ignored, so a failed transfer still reduces the balance.

  3. F-03highL13

    Authorization via tx.origin

    Phishing a contract call from the owner lets an attacker pass this check.

Human-verified before delivery Sample contract, not client code

120+

Contracts audited

34

Critical findings

$1.2B

Value secured

6h

Median time to first finding

Figures are PLACEHOLDER values until verified numbers are published.

// 03 — Research

Findings we've published.

Long-form write-ups of issues Kvazar found, with timelines and fixes.

All research

// 04 — Our work

Protocols we've audited, fixed or reported to.

View all

// 05 — Case studies

What an engagement looks like.

All case studies

// 06 — Blog

Notes from the audit desk.

All posts

Interested in using the Kvazar platform?

Early access is open to a small number of teams. Tell us what you're building and we'll reply within 24 hours.

Or email us